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South Africa (SA)’s record 
in handling the initial HIV/
AIDS pandemic (without 
anti retroviral drugs) and the 
rapid spread of extensively 
drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR TB) are 
major red flags warning that it may not have 
the capacity to face the deadly drug-defiant 
West African Ebola virus.
SA’s daily TB death rate is nearly ten times 
the average daily Ebola death rate across the 
four affected West African countries from 
March this year – a sobering compar ison 
when contemplating how we would handle 
an Ebola outbreak. Besides that, XDR TB 
kills 90% of its victims (multidrug-resistant 
(MDR) TB 50% – about the same as a West 
African Ebola victim’s survival chances).
These analogies were drawn by an expert on 
disease surveillance and laboratory systems, 
Dr Andrew Medina-Marino, on his return to 
SA from Ebola-ravaged Liberia, one of the four 
West African countries across which the virus 
had claimed more than 1 900 lives among 4 000 
suspected infections between early March and 
3 September this year – and the pandemic is 
accelerating. A total of 2 200 infections were 
confirmed in the woefully inadequate mobile 
laboratories, with hundreds more people certain 
to die, as what is justifiably one of the world’s 
most-feared diseases has a nearly 50% current 
fatality rate. No Ebola cases have been confirmed 
among the hundreds of blood samples sent to 
the local National Institute for Communicable 
Diseases (NICD) for testing from throughout 
South African Development Community 
(SADC) member states, but the region is on 
high alert with emergency contingency plans 
for co-operation in detection, containment and 
awareness on ‘fast-track’, and a travel ban on all 
travellers from the affected countries in place. 
Because of SA and her immediate neighbours’ 
geographical distance from West Africa – and 
the acute and severe nature of Ebola virus 
disease – officials claim it is ‘highly unlikely’ 
that cases will enter via land or sea. The highest-
risk entry ports are OR Tambo International 
Airport in Gauteng and the nearby Lanseria 
Airport, from which all major medical air 
rescue company aircraft operate (two inter-
nationally). Travellers are being thermally 
screened at these airports and anyone with an 
elevated temperature questioned further, while 
OR Tambo has a modern emergency isolation/
transfer medical centre.
SA’s shaky track record 
on drug-defying diseases
A retrospective look at SA’s XDR TB spread by 
Prof. Keertan Dheda, arguably the country’s 
leading expert on drug-resistant TB, at the 
National TB Conference in Durban in June, 
plus the lack of any communicable diseases 
regulation 6 years after the draft provisions 
were first published, add pinches of salt to 
ongoing public reassurances. Dheda, Professor 
of Medicine and Head of Pulmonology at 
the University of Cape Town (and one of the 
most published and cited TB academics in the 
country), estimates that several thousand local 
healthcare workers are currently TB-infected 
(the annual infection rate is 2 - 3%), while 
140 people die of all types of TB every day. 
Evidence that MDR TB is out of control is 
backed by known data; it has increased from 
7 350 notified cases in 2007 to 14 161 in 2012. 
Dheda told Izindaba: ‘We should be far more 
afraid of existing XDR TB than any fairly slim 
chances of an Ebola outbreak.’
While TB’s incubation period and mode 
of transmission are very different to Ebola’s 
(airborne spread v. bodily fluid and infected 
tissue spread), common denominators include 
infecting first-line primary healthcare workers, 
a dysfunctional public health system, low 
public awareness of basic infection control, and 
dismal, inappropriate education. At the Durban 
TB conference, Dheda made an impassioned 
plea for a nationally co-ordinated strategy 
to avoid the discharge of highly contagious 
‘therapeutically destitute’ TB patients back 
into a careless void, with uniquely tailored 
solu tions including home-based or community 
care, plus multidisciplinary teams in modern-
day sanatoria.
If there’s a local 
outbreak, pray it’s small 
and localised – expert
Medina-Marino believes that general Ebola 
virus disease outbreak expertise and disease 
surveillance capacity in SA is probably 
insufficient to deal with ‘anything more than 
a small, geographically contained outbreak’. 
Senior Technical Advisor (Disease Surveillance 
and Laboratory Systems) at the local Foundation 
for Professional Development (FPD), he 
believes that a scattered West African-type 
Ebola outbreak in our townships could quickly 
turn into a public health nightmare. (The West 
African outbreak is the first in the world to reach 
urban areas.) Our government would have to 
lean heavily on the mainly US-funded NICD to 
roll out epidemiological and outbreak control 
programmes. Medina-Marino returned from 
a month of voluntary work in Ebola-ravaged 
Liberia early this August, where he gained 
invaluable experience and witnessed some of 
the rampant contagion first-hand.
His views, particularly about dysfunctional 
health systems, were echoed in principle by 
Prof. Sharon Fonn of the School of Public 
Health, University of the Witwatersrand, and 
co-director of the Consortium for Advanced 
Research Training in Africa, while Prof. Lucille 
Blumberg, head of the NICD’s Surveillance 
and Outbreak Response Unit, warned that 
any Ebola outbreak would rapidly expose any 
existing deficiencies in a public health system, 
with poverty and fear aggravating contagion. 
With 150 healthcare workers dead among the 
more than 250 infected in the four (previously 
unaffected) West African outbreak countries, 
a graphic illustration of the ‘fear factor’ has 
already played out in SA. According to Dr 
Frew Benson, Chief Director of Communicable 
Diseases in the National Department of Health 
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Dr Andrew Medina-Marino, local disease surv-
eillance and laboratory systems expert, at a newly 
built isolation facility in Monrovia, Liberia, in 
August. Picture source: Dr Medina-Marino.
He believes that the widespread 
SA XDR TB epidemic is 
analogous to the West African 
Ebola outbreak when it comes 
to comparing public health 
responses in the absence of any 
available medical intervention.
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(NDoH), local nurses treating an already 
negatively diagnosed but heavily pregnant 
Ebola suspect refused to ‘scrub in’ for her 
caesarean section, doing so only under orders 
when told she was uninfected. ‘You can imagine 
if we see more cases in SA, what the [caregiver] 
impact would be,’ he warned at an Ebola 
briefing at Wits University in late August.
West Africa outbreak 
‘out of control’
The severity of the epidemic is illustrated by 
one startling fact: the confirmed case tally on 
3 September was 10% more than all Ebola 
cases ever reported worldwide (2 000 people). 
Medina-Marino spoke to Izindaba after 
reading our report on the state of SA’s Ebola 
prevention readiness, sharing his thoughts on 
interventions that would enable more effective 
detection and curtailment of any cases that 
might cross our borders. He is a veteran of the 
prestigious Centers for Disease Control in the 
USA, whose director Thomas Frieden warned 
on 2 September that ‘the window is closing’ on 
containing the West African epidemic, which 
he labelled ‘a global problem’. Medina-Marino 
was seconded to the FPD, where he took a 
permanent job 3 years ago. He said there was 
‘no question’ but that SA had among the world’s 
best laboratory diagnostic capabilities, SA being 
one of only three countries asked by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) to send mobile 
diagnostic laboratories to West Africa. As one of 
the few doctors in SA with high-level outbreak 
response expertise, he volunteered to work 
cheek-by-jowl with colleagues from the world’s 
uncontested Ebola outbreak veteran, Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF). MSF has 700 staff in 
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. 
Lindis Hurum, MSF emergency co-ordinator 
for Liberia’s capital, Monrovia, described the 
situation as ‘catastrophic’, with most of the city’s 
hospitals closed and decomposing and highly 
infectious bodies lying in streets and houses. 
WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan 
declared the outbreak an international public 
health emergency, admitting that it was moving 
‘faster than we can control it’. The WHO is being 
severely criticised by a hugely overburdened 
MSF for its slow response (belatedly begun 
only after two deaths and seven confirmed 
cases in Lagos, Nigeria, the regional hub for 
international travel and business). Chan called 
for a global co-ordinated effort to combat what 
she termed ‘the largest, most severe and most 
complex outbreak in the nearly four-decade 
history of this disease’. MSF President Dr Joanne 
Liu said her organisation was ‘overwhelmed’ 
and could now offer ‘no more than palliative 
care’, needing 800 additional beds for MSF’s 
160-bed Monrovian treatment centre alone. She 
said that rather than limit their responses to the 
potential arrival of an infected patient in their 
member countries, global health bodies ‘should 
be helping save lives in West Africa’.
SA’s poor track record 
in the early days of HIV 
and current XDR TB 
spread
Medina-Marino said that when it came to 
disease outbreaks, SA had already clumsily 
faced the ‘quite desperate’ HIV pandemic 
(initially without antiretroviral drugs) and 
was currently failing to curtail a burgeoning 
XDR TB pandemic because of the lack of 
appropriate facilities and care to contain and 
prevent the highly infectious disease, for which 
no proven drug treatment exists. The country’s 
response capacity (and expertise) remained 
focused on clinical care and treatment. When it 
came to identifying appropriate infection-risk 
factors and contact tracing, there was ‘still a 
lot of work to be done’. In his opinion, only the 
mainly externally funded NICD was properly 
prepared to respond to an outbreak. Regardless 
of what the country’s disease control officials 
said, SA did not have the capacity for full-
scale investigations, especially for an outbreak 
anywhere near the scale of West Africa’s. It 
could ‘probably handle between one and three 
isolated cases’. ‘When things actually happen, 
the system breaks down very fast,’ he said. ‘All 
the money in the world’ could not make up for 
delayed and unco-ordinated responses.
Prof. Fonn said that while SA’s doctor-patient 
and nurse-patient ratios were better than those 
in the affected countries (SA has 8 doctors 
per 100 000 population v. half a doctor per 
100 000 for Liberia and Sierra Leone, 1/100 000 
for Guinea and 4/100 000 for Nigeria), there 
was no room for complacency. She called on 
the international community and countries to 
invest in the broader health system capacity and 
not respond to each event as if it were a crisis.
‘Curricula for medical students, nurses and 
doctors are inadequate and inappropriate (one 
basic example is not being taught how to put 
on and take off personal protection equipment 
without becoming infected). We don’t have 
systems for quick, effective communication 
between providers and tailored to the local 
burden of disease, should anything happen, 
let alone an Ebola outbreak,’ said Fonn. Public 
messaging campaigns should be conducted 
before any outbreak, to avoid spreading panic 
in the population, ‘so that when it happens, 
you’re reimporting an old message’, she added. 
Simply responding to an epidemic was ‘totally 
inadequate’, she said, stressing that putting 
money into ‘the most cost-effective’ health 
programmes was an internationally and 
oft-repeated ‘mistake’. ‘What people don’t 
understand is that the healthcare system is the 
sea upon which health programmes float. Over 
and over, we put money into the ships and not 
into the sea,’ she said.
Blumberg stressed that once Ebola reached 
the cities it became very difficult to contain, 
the main enemies being poverty, fear and 
dysfunctional health systems. She said that the 
NICD’s mobile health laboratory in Liberia 
was ‘extremely busy’, with every second 
sample testing positive. Benson claims that 
48 of SA’s health districts have received Ebola 
prevention and awareness training, while 
defence forces throughout the SADC region 
would be called in to curtail movement should 
an outbreak occur. Ebola-ready hospitals had 
been designated in every province, including 
one private sector hospital and two military 
hospitals (Medina-Marino questions how 
properly equipped they are). With the paucity 
of institutional training, basic healthcare 
worker protection training was being stepped 
up, while immigration officials were receiving 
twice-weekly updates and training and broader 
multi sectoral awareness was being accelerated.
Vicious ‘circle of 
infection’
Benson said that strengthening SA’s screen-
ing capacity and facilities was essential. ‘An 
outbreak becomes a vicious circle; once the 
health system becomes affected it feeds into 
the outbreak itself,’ he admitted.
Asked what basic precautions should be 
taken by SA healthcare workers, Medina-
Marino said that simply wearing gloves and 
asking patients whether they’d recently been 
in West Africa or in contact with someone 
from there would generally suffice. He chall-
enged Benson’s contention that people with 
Beyond here lies death – without personal pro-
tection equipment. Picture source: Dr Medina-
Marino.
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Ebola were usually ‘very sick’ and typically 
presented to a hospital. In Medina-Marino’s 
experience one of the first places a person with 
Ebola symptoms went to was a primary or 
community health clinic (all 250 West African 
healthcare workers were infected in this way). 
Here doctors and nurses were (initially) ‘not 
necessarily thinking this person has Ebola’ and 
interacted freely with patients, posing a major 
infection risk. Medina-Marino emphasised 
that there was ‘no need to panic’, but cautioned 
that there was ‘good reason’ for the SA govern-
ment to be better prepared. 
His ‘don’t panic’ message was echoed by Dr 
Charl van Loggerenberg, Regional Medical 
Director of International SOS (a 24/7 corporate 
medical assistance company that also includes 
the Air Rescue Africa air ambulance operation), 
who spoke to Izindaba on his return from an 
NDoH consultation of all relevant SA role 
players in the public and private sectors in 
Gauteng on 22 August. He revealed that the SA 
travel ban on passengers coming from any of 
the affected West African countries would not 
apply to medical air rescue companies, which 
already implemented the highest possible pre- 
and in-flight viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) 
safety protocols and compliance with port health 
procedures for all clients. Van Loggerenberg 
said that the SA government wanted to use 
the global expertise of companies like his and 
Netcare 911 to help gather information and 
disseminate the best possible clinical pathways 
and emergency health worker precautionary 
guidelines. He said that general and nursing 
practitioners in border areas were the ‘world’s 
best gatekeepers’, warning, however, that they 
should take robust travel histories from any 
patient presenting with fever associated even 
with mundane complaints such as toothache 
or earache. Netcare has developed a set of 
comprehensive clinical pathways that are used 
routinely as a precautionary measure by its 
emergency medical staff, doctors and hospital 
staff to assess any patient exposed to risk factors 
associated with VHF. 
Asked why he thought the situation in Liberia 
had deteriorated so quickly, Medina-Marino 
said the civil war had ‘decimated’ its’ health 
infrastructure, leaving the government starved 
of resources to deal with the scale of the outbreak. 
Another aggravating factor was sociocultural: 
because of the war, communities distrusted 
any government intrusion, refusing health 
authorities permission to remove dead bodies. 
In Liberia’s war-ravaged northern Barkadu 
district, communities actually barricaded 
themselves. Health officials, only admitted after 
a fortnight, discovered 20 bodies and 15 people 
near death. ‘Basically they didn’t believe Ebola 
was real and only called for help when they were 
scared witless. Similar stories abound in Sierra 
Leone and Guinea,’ he said. Another major 
issue was the unprotected washing, embalming 
or dressing of bodies as part of the pre-funeral 
rites. At burials many mourners also touched 
the body as a ‘final farewell’. ‘How do you tell 
these communities to stop their traditions?’ he 
asked. Another tragic and almost unavoidable 
problem was Ebola-infected children – if a child 
is vomiting or sick, how do you tell a mother or 
father not to touch them?
Ebola spread in war-torn 
Liberia ‘out of control’
By the time Medina-Marino left on 9 August, 
the situation in Liberia was ‘completely 
out of control’. He said that the unique 
and unprecedented nature of the current 
widespread, urban West African outbreak 
(previous outbreaks in rural East Africa 
had been geographically ‘clustered’) meant 
there were ‘no models to deal with this’. He 
believes that the widespread SA XDR TB 
epidemic is analogous to the West African 
Ebola outbreak in terms of comparing 
public health responses in the absence of any 
available medical intervention.
Both Benson and Blumberg agreed that 
healthcare workers were at greatest risk. 
Ebola, the onset of which is sudden and 
severe, is only infectious when its carrier is 
symptomatic and ill (and for some time after 
death). It typically only spreads via contact 
with bodily fluids and infected tissue. These 
include blood, vomit, faeces, sweat, saliva, 
tears, urine and (least likely, though feasible) 
semen. Unprotected home care settings, 
low hygiene awareness and the tradition of 
washing the newly dead mean that it wipes 
out entire families and communities, with 
the spread amplified in hospitals with poor 
infection control practices.
Thermal scanning more 
political than pragmatic
She said that thermal scanning at airports 
was relatively ineffective, as somebody 
incubating the virus could be asymptomatic. 
Its ‘yield’ was infinitesimally low, and it 
was far more political than pragmatic. 
Meanwhile, the SADC ministers of health 
plus the regional SADC and WHO officials 
held an emergency meeting in Johannesburg 
on 6 August to collaborate on critical Ebola 
detection, prevention and control strategies, 
releasing a lengthy statement of intent.
Izindaba has established that the four known 
Ebola cases air-lifted to the USA and Spain for 
treatment (one died, three were ‘improving’) 
were foreign healthcare workers and/or 
missionaries. Their treat ment on home soil with 
the promising but experimental drug Z-Mapp 
(and that of a select few West African patients) 
sparked controversy, given that more than 1 900 
Africans have died without access to existing 
(low) stocks. However, medical ethicists pointed 
to Z-Mapp’s untested nature, saying that public 
health measures should be paramount.
At the time of writing, the Ebola death 
toll in the then newly affected Democratic 
Republic of Congo had reached 31, albeit 
from a different strain to that in West Africa.
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Dr Medina-Marino with a volunteer helper and Ebola survivor (he presented early). Picture source: 
Dr Medina-Marino.
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